NeTS: Small: Collaborative Research:
Unleashing Spectrum Effectively and Willingly:
Optimization and Incentives
Reference #: CNS 1420881/1421685
Sponsor: NSF CNS Core Programs
PIs: Guoliang Xue (1421685), Dejun Yang (1420881)
Duration: 09/01/2014 - 08/31/2017
An intriguing fact emerges during the study of spectrum usage.
On one hand, the proliferation of wireless devices, e.g. smartphones, laptops,
and tablets, and bandwidth-hungry applications has resulted in the problem of
spectrum scarcity. On the other hand, a recent report by FCC reveals that the
licensed users are extremely underutilizing the allocated spectrum.
To remove the barriers to efficient spectrum utilization, this project aims to
1) design effective spectrum allocation algorithms to allow as many secondary
users (SUs) to coexist with the primary user (PU) as possible while taking into
account the interference generated by both SUs and PU; and
2) develop incentive mechanisms for enticing spectrum licensees to share or
license their under-utilized spectrum for better utilization.
While designing spectrum allocation schemes, the physical interference model
is adopted to characterize the interference closely to reality.
Joint optimization of spectrum allocation and power control is explored to
further improve the spectrum utilization. This can lead to efficient approximation
algorithms with guaranteed performance comparing with the optimum, as well as
effective heuristic algorithms.
Another major task of this project is to design incentive auctions for enticing
spectrum licensees to share their spectrum with unlicensed users in exchange
for the proceeds from the auction.
Three different application scenarios are investigated:
1) the spectrum holder is willing to coexist with the unlicensed users under
the condition that the cumulative interference caused by them does not interrupt
its own transmission;
2) small network operators are allowed to form groups for collective buying power
to increase their chances of winning the spectrum; and
3) the competition among multiple spectrum licensees is considered.
This research can help ensure wireless networks in the USA keep pace with the
continuously increasing demand for spectrum, so that they can support activities
that increasingly rely on them, including public safety and health-care.
The designed group-buying based incentive auctions can provide opportunities for
small businesses to compete against big brand companies and win the access to
desired spectrum that is essential to the success of their business.
These small businesses are the engines of job creation and economic growth for
the country. This project involves under-represented and minority students, as
well as K-12 students to inspire their interests in science and engineering.
- X. Zhang, G. Xue, R. Yu, D. Yang, J. Tang;
"Countermeasures Against False-Name Attacks on Truthful Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing";
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications;
Vol 35(2017), pp. 478-485.
- M. Brown, C. Marshall, D. Yang, M. Li, J. Lin, G. Xue;
"Maximizing capacity in cognitive radio networks under physical
IEEE/ACM Transaction on Networking;
accepted for publication.
- D. Yang, G. Xue, X. Zhang;
"Group buying spectrum auctions in cognitive radio networks";
IEEE Transaction on Vehicular Technology;
Vol. 66(2017), pp. 810-817.
- H. Zhang, B. Liu, H. Susanto, G. Xue, T. Sun;
"Incentive Mechanism for Proximity-based Mobile Crowd Service Systems";
IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications;
April 10-15, San Francisco, USA.
- X. Zhang, G. Xue, D. Yang, R. Yu, X. Huang;
"TSA: a framework of truthful spectrum auctions under the physical
IEEE International Conference on Communications;
June 8-12, 2015, London, UK.
- Y. Zhang, D. Yang, G. Xue, J. Tang;
"A spectrum auction under physical interference model";
IEEE Global Communications Conference;